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    Fei Chen 
This paper designs an event study to empirically test if there is an abnormal 
return aroused by share repurchase announcements in Chinese capital 
market. By using the Market Model, we get the data of abnormal returns, 
cumulative abnormal returns, which are used for 11-day and 21-day windows 
testing. After the t-tests and the bootstrap tests, the results indicate that there 
exists a positive relationship between the stock buybacks and the abnormal 
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1.1 Purpose of Study 
A long-standing question in Finance is how capital-markets react to firms’ 
share repurchase announcements. This paper focuses on the firms listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), and designs an event study to 
empirically test the research question. The test results are then compared 
with the findings from other stock markets. The results may be helpful for 
individual and institutional investors in making related decisions on their 
positions in SSE stocks. 
1.2 Background 
Share repurchase refers to an event that a firm buys back its own shares from 
existing shareholders in the open market using cash. This process involves 
accounting adjustments in a firm’s balance sheet and cash flow statement. 
The methods to achieve repurchases include open market operation, direct 
negotiation, fixed price tender and Dutch auction. 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) is one of two Chinese mainland stock 
exchanges, founded on Nov 26th, 1990. The other is Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). SSE is a membership institution directly governed by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). By the end of 2012, there 
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were 954 listed stocks on SSE with a total market capitalization of RMB 
15,869.844 billion, and free-float market capitalization of RMB 13,429.445 
billion.  
Share repurchase was introduced into China in 1990. However, it is still new 
to Chinese stock market. Between the period 2005 and 2012, less than 100 
listed firms on the SSE have announced and completed stock repurchase 
agreements. For the laws and rules involved, Companies Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2005) cites the restrictions on share repurchases. The 
Article 143 allows a firm to reacquire its own stocks in four situations only, i.e. 
1) reducing its registered capital, 2) merging with another company that holds 
its shares, 3) rewarding the staff and workers of the company with its shares, 
or 4) a shareholder requesting the company to purchase his shares because 
he holds objections to the resolution on the merger or division of the company 
adopted by the shareholders general assembly. 
1.3 Need for Study 
Numerous studies shed light on the rationales behind a firm’s share 
repurchase activities. The motivations can be explained by many hypotheses 
including1) Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis, i.e. managers use 
repurchase announcement as a signal that they are convinced the firm has a 
good prospect and its stocks are undervalued (Asquith and Mullins, 1986); 2) 
Leverage Ratio Hypothesis, i.e. a firm increases financial leverage through 
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share repurchases in order to optimize the capital structure (Bagwell and 
Shoven, 1988; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001); 3) Free Cash Flow 
Hypothesis, i.e. free cash flow hypothesis that excess cash flow increases a 
company’s agency cost (Jensen, 1986); 4) Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
Hypothesis, i.e. a firm achieves the increase in earnings per share through 
share repurchases, so as to enhance the value of its stock price (Koretz and 
Mehring, 2004; and Dobbs and Rehm, 2005); 5) Takeover Deterrence 
Hypothesis, i.e. a company protects itself from a hostile takeover through 
share repurchases (Dann and DeAngelo, 1983; Bradley and Wakeman, 1983); 
6) Management Incentive Hypothesis, i.e. when managers hold stock options, 
a firm can encourage managers by using stock buybacks to maintain or raise 
stock price ( Fenn and Liang, 1998; Jolls, 1998; and Weisbenner, 1998). 
Scholars have outlined four reasons for Chinese publicly traded companies’ 
decision to repurchase stocks: 1) to reduce state-owned shares in order to 
optimize capital structure, 2) to be consistent with the share reform required 
by the authorities, 3) to maintain and enhance the company's stock value, 4) 
to achieve equity incentive plan inside a firm. For the first, third and the last 
reasons, they are in line with signaling hypothesis, leverage ratio hypothesis 
and management incentive hypothesis consistent separately. 
According to Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), US market is semi-strong 
efficient; while Chinese market has been tested by many Chinese scholars as 
weak-form efficiency. Chinese stock market has lower degree on the speed of 
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prices adjustment to information and the accuracy with which prices adjust. 
Considered this, the time interval should be set appropriately for event and 
estimation window during the test.  
1.4 Statement of problems 
This paper examines whether an abnormal return exists around the share 
repurchase announcement date in Chinese stock market. The data used is 
available from SSE during the period of 2005 and the 1st half of 2013. The 
sample includes all observations available during the period above, with 37 
firms and 40 repurchase events in total.  
This paper is composed of six chapters organized as follows: 1) Chapter One 
makes a general introduction and brief discussions on share repurchase; 2) 
Chapter Two involves a literature review on the development of share 
repurchase theories; 3) Chapter Three explains the methodology used for 
testing; 4) Chapter Four displays and analyze the results of the test; 5) Finally, 








A firm may repurchase stocks for several reasons. It is therefore important to 
consider all the motives when investigating market reaction to a firm’s stock 
buyback. This chapter will first cover the motivation hypotheses in detail, and 
then analyze the stock repurchase motives for Chinese firms. 
2.1 Motivation hypotheses  
Many academic researchers have studied the effects of stock repurchase 
based on one or several motivation hypotheses. With the development of 
capital market, the main reason for a firm’s stock buyback has been changed. 
Stock repurchase hypothesis theory has also experienced a process of 
development. So far, six hypotheses have been documented and carried out 
for empirical research. 
Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis 
Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis asserts that managers use repurchase 
announcement as a signal that they are convinced the firm has a good 
prospect and its stocks are undervalued (Asquith and Mullins 1986). This 
hypothesis is based on the information asymmetry premise that insiders have 
more information about a firm’s future prospects than shareholders. 
Asymmetric information makes it difficult for shareholders to make rational 
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decisions. When insiders believe that the firm is undervalued, they use stock 
buyback as a signal to the market and investors. Under this hypothesis, the 
market should react positively to stock repurchase announcements and the 
stock price adjustment accurately reflects the mispricing. (Dann, 1981; 
Vermaelen, 1981; and Comment and Jarrell, 1991).  
Numerous researches have detected short-term abnormal return after 
announcements of stock repurchase. Dann (1980) and Vermaelen (1981) 
found that 1) the average buyback price of fixed price offers exceeded 23% of 
the stock price before the repurchase announcement. After the 
announcement, the company's share price rose 16% on average; 2) the 
abnormal return of ordinary bonds and preferred shares was 0; 3) convertible 
bonds had a significant positive return.  
Comment and Jarrell (1991) studied fixed price tender, Dutch auction and 
open market operation, three ways of market repurchase. They found that 1) 
after the fixed price offer announcement, the company’s stock price had 11% 
abnormal return on average; while for Dutch auction and open market 
repurchase, the company’s stock price had an average abnormal return of 8% 
and 2% respectively; 2) after the open market buyback was announced, the 
abnormal return of the stock price had no relationship with the market return, 
while it was negatively correlated to the return of the stock price before 
repurchase announcement. Since managers face risks in different degrees 
(higher the premium paid, the greater the risk management), fixed price offer 
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had the strongest signaling effect while open market repurchase had the 
weakest. Therefore, the market reacted the strongest to the fixed price offer. 
Comment and Jarrell also cited that signaling hypothesis is not the only 
motive for share repurchases, because if the company tried to pass the 
undervaluation signal to the market, it would choose fixed price offer buyback. 
However, the majority of companies used open market and Dutch auction 
repurchase instead. The signal transmission capacity of the two buyback 
methods was the weakest.  
Leverage Ratio Hypothesis 
Leverage Ratio Hypothesis is developed on the premise that a firm increases 
financial leverage through share repurchases in order to optimize the capital 
structure. According to the traditional capital structure theory, within a certain 
range, the increase in the proportion of debt will reduce a company's cost of 
capital, thus resulting in an increase in the company's market value. The 
modified modern capital structure theory, also called Modigliani–Miller (MM) 
Theorem implies that a company can increase its market value by using 
financial leverage. To increase financial leverage by debt financing, a 
company can get the benefits of tax deduction and profitability improvement.  
Masulis (1980) categorized the 138 buyback samples into two groups by debt 
ratio more than 50% or less than 50%. He found that the group with larger 
debt ratio had higher average return of 21.9% surrounding repurchase 
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announcement date, while the group with lower debt ratio had only 17.1% 
return on average. The results were consistent with the leverage ratio 
hypothesis. 
Bagwell and Shoven (1988), Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Lie (2002) 
as well as Hovakimian (2004) empirically studied and all announced the 
positive relationship between stock repurchase profitability and leverage 
deficit. In their researches, companies tended to have debt ratios lower than 
the target level, so that they could achieve the optimization of capital structure 
by using stock repurchases.  
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) proposed free cash flow hypothesis that excess cash flow 
increases a company’s agency cost. That is, managers tend to benefit 
themselves from investing these free cash in suboptimal investment projects 
or inefficient acquisition activities, so they will take less investment risk or 
control business in larger scope. To reduce the agency cost caused by free 
cash flow, managers should return excess cash to shareholders, and share 
buybacks is considered to be an effective way.  
Consistent with Jensen, Vafeas and Joy (1995), Fenn and Liang (1997), and 
Nohel and Tarhen (1998) pointed out that open market share repurchases can 
reduce the agency costs generated by the free cash flow. 
Evidences also show that if a firm has strong shareholder right, excess cash 
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is more likely to be sent out to shareholders by repurchases rather than be 
retained inside the firm by managers for own benefits; vice versa 
Jiraporn(2006). 
Earnings Per Share Hypothesis 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) Hypothesis is that a firm achieves the increase in 
earnings per share through share repurchases, so as to enhance the value of 
its stock price. Koretz and Mehring (2004), Dobbs and Rehm (2005) did 
empirical studies and announced that if profits remain unchanged, repurchase 
will push up earning per share by reducing the number of shares outstanding; 
if profits increase, earning per share will increase more. 
However, there exist two drawbacks of EPS hypothesis: 1) although stock 
repurchase reduces outstanding shares, it causes the decrease in total assets 
of a company; 2) when EPS increases by stock repurchase, a company’s 
financial leverage also Increases, so that the company's financial risk rises to 
a higher level. 
Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis 
Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis is that a company protects itself from a 
hostile takeover through share repurchases, which can reduce the equity and 
raise the stock price. In the Mid-1980s, the U.S. government loosed the 
market regulation. This led to the prevailing of hostile takeovers between 
companies. Dann and DeAngelo (1983), Bradley and Wakeman (1983) 
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analyzed the reason behind a company’s private repurchase agreement, and 
found that reasons the company's share price fell by an average of 4% 
following repurchase announcement, that is, shareholders who did not 
participate the repurchase got the average loss of 4%. The higher premium a 
firm paid, the more the stock price declined after buyback declaration. In 
comparison, if a company repurchase stock by market price, there is no 
significant change of the price after buyback announcement. 
Management Incentive Hypothesis 
Management Incentive Hypothesis is that when managers hold stock options, 
a firm can encourage managers by using stock buybacks to maintain or raise 
stock price. Fenn and Liang (1998), Jolls (1998) and Weisbenner (1998) 
proposed the point to support the hypothesis that compared with dividend 
distribution, stock repurchase will not dilute the per-share value of a firm.  
Khael (2002) studied the stock repurchases based on this hypothesis. He 
claimed that the wide use of employee stock option changed a firm’s 
compensation system, and affected its stock buyback decisions. This is in line 
with the increase in stock repurchases in 1990s.  
2.2 Chinese firms’ stock buyback motives  
Share repurchase was introduced into China in 1990s. The first successful 
case is that Da Yuyuan Inc. mergered Xiao Yuyuan Inc. by share repurchase 
in 1992. Besides, several cases before 1990 are involved with repurchase for 
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different purposes, for examples, Lujiazui signed the agreement of 
repurchasing state-owned shares for the purpose of issuing B shares, and 
Xiamen International Trade Inc. bought back part of its stocks to reduce its 
registered capital. Until 1999 when Yuntianhua and Shennenggufen 
successful repurchased some state-owned shares, shares repurchase firstly 
aroused widespread concern in the market. However, Chinese firms were lack 
of enthusiasm in stock repurchase, due to constraints in Company Law, 
capital shortage and long-term bear market at that time.  
The milestone is that the share reform began to be implemented in 2005. 
Series of laws and rules were set up or modified in line with the reform. For an 
example, Article 143 in Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(2005) cites that a firm can reacquire its own stocks under four situations, i.e. 
1) reducing its registered capital, 2) merging with another company that holds 
its shares, 3) rewarding the staff and workers of the company with its shares, 
or 4) a shareholder requesting the company to purchase his shares because 
he holds objections to the resolution on the merger or division of the company 
adopted by the shareholders general assembly. The policy of share reform 
boomed the stock repurchases between 2005 and 2007; among them, the 
main motivations are reducing state-owned shares and completing the share 
reform inside a firm. 
In October2008, under the extremely inactive stock market background, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the new stock repurchase 
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rules to remove the license constraints in stock repurchase so that open 
market operation can be executed. This further improved the country's stock 
buyback system, and effectively promoted the stock repurchase development. 
Since then, stock repurchases have increased significantly, and reached 
another peak. During this period, the main motivation tends to be multiple and 
diversified. 
Scholars have outlined four reasons for Chinese publicly traded companies’ 
decision to repurchase stocks: 1) to reduce state-owned shares in order to 
optimize capital structure, 2) to be consistent with the share reform required 
by the authorities, 3) to maintain and enhance the company's stock value, 4) 
to achieve equity incentive plan inside a firm. For the first, third and the last 
reasons, they are in line with signaling hypothesis, leverage ratio hypothesis 
and management incentive hypothesis consistent respectively. The motives of 
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The six motivation hypotheses covered in this chapter are not mutually 
exclusive. Numerous cases indicate that companies may execute share 
repurchases for more than one purpose (Guffey and Schneider 2004, Bozanic 
2010). Therefore, using only one hypothesis theory to explain the motivation 
of stock repurchases is almost impossible; in other words, single hypothesis 
cannot explain all the effects of buybacks. 
In Chinese stock market, share repurchase is still new to the publicly traded 
firms and investors. Between the period 2005 and 2010, only 75 listed firms 
on SSE have announced stock repurchase, posted by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. After the share reform achieved, it tends to be a 
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significant tool to improve capital structure. Now share repurchase is playing a 







3.1 Introduction to Research Design 
An event study has been designed to empirically test whether share 
repurchase announcements are value enhancing or value destroying 
activities. If on average market reacts positively to repurchase 
announcements, then we can reasonably conclude that share repurchases 
are value enhancing activities; vice versa.  
The most important assumption for this study is that Chinese stock market is 
weak-form efficient based on EMH, i.e., compared with US market, Chinese 
stock market has lower degree on the speed of prices adjustment to 
information and the accuracy with which prices adjust. As a result, a long 
period of time should be selected for estimation window. Except the market 
efficiency assumption, two more assumptions are set to simplify our study. 
One of them is only one event happening during announcement period. Since 
firms may make more than one announcement to complete one share 
repurchase event, we only focus on market reaction to the first announcement.  
The other assumption is that non-public materials are not available in 





3.2 Data and Sample 
All the data for testing are collected from reliable sources - Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) statistics and Da Zhi Hui database. Da Zhi Hui, one of the 
most popular software to Chinese investors, maintains substantial historical 
transaction data. 
For the sample, all the firms listed on SSE which announced stock 
repurchases during 2005 and 1st half of 2013 events are selected excluding 
four situations: 1) merger-related repurchases, 2) debts restructuring 
repurchases, 3) B shares repurchases, and 4) not-complete-yet repurchases. 
In total, 37 firms with 40 share repurchase announcements are identified and 
added in the sample. Each firm’s historical returns surrounding 
announcements are downloaded from Da Zhi Hui database.  
3.3 Measurement Procedure  
To do the study, steps listed below need to be followed.  
Step 1: Preparing the data, estimation and event window.  
Identifying events and involved event periods are the first step. As shown in 
the figure below, the repurchase announcement date is set as t=0; the days 
before t=0 are identified minus while the days after are identified positive. 
Daily returns of the sample are collected in two different periods. The first 
period is Event Window, from t=-5 to t=+5, totally 11 days surrounding the 
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share repurchase announcement. The second period is Estimation Window, 
from t=-60 to t=-30, used to forecast the normal performance in Event Window; 
Estimation Window is a clean period, where we assume that no relevant 




                              
 
 
Step 2: Estimating normal performance using a Market Model. 
The daily stock return and the daily market return are prepared for the Market 










 𝑃𝑖,𝑡   is the close price of stock i at date t.  
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  is the close price of stock i at date t-1.  
𝑃𝑚,𝑡   is the close price of SSE Composite Index at date t.  
𝑃𝑚,𝑡−1 is the close price of SSE Composite Index at date t-1.  
Estimation  Window       Event  Window 
-60               -30    -5     0     +5 
Announcement Day  




Here, SSE Composite Index is used as the benchmark for the market return.  
The Market Model establishes a linear relationship between a stock return 
and the market return. The formula 3-1 is shown below: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (3-1) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡   is the daily return of stock i at date t.  
𝑅𝑚,𝑡  is the daily return of the market at date t; here, SSE Composite Index is 
used as the benchmark. 
𝛼𝑖,𝑡   is the interception of the regression model, or the constant term. 
𝛽𝑖,𝑡   is the slope of the regression model. 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡   is the error term of stock i return at date t.  
 
Step 3: Estimating the Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
The Abnormal Return (AR) is calculated by subtracting expected normal 
return from actual return. The formula 3-2 is shown below: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,?̂?                  (3-2) 
where 𝑅𝑖,?̂? is the expected normal return estimated by the Market Model. 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for a given period is the sum of the 
daily abnormal return. The formula 3-3 is shown below: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑛=𝑡                   (3-3) 
where 𝑛 is the total number of the observed announcements in the sample; 
here, 𝑛 is 40. 
The Average Abnormal Return (AAR) for a given period is the mean of the 









𝑛=𝑡           (3-4) 
 
Step 4: Testing for significance. 
T-test is used to detect the significance of the abnormal return caused by a 
stock repurchase announcement. To conduct a t-test, the null hypothesis and 
the alternative hypothesis are defined as follows: 
1）The null hypothesis H0 : 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖= 0, the average abnormal return is equal 
to zero 
2）The alternative hypothesis H1 : 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖≠0, the average abnormal return is 
not equal to zero 
Step 5: Testing for significance of all events.  
Bootstrap test is a z-test to see whether the abnormal return is significant for 






Results and Analysis 
This chapter displays the regression results from STATA program. The results 
will answer the research question proposed at beginning, that how Chinese 
capital market reacts to share repurchase announcements.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, 37 firms listed on SSE with 40 stock buybacks 
events during 2005 and 1st half of 2013 are selected for the sample. The study 
focuses on the 11-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the 
repurchase announcement. In comparison, this chapter will also show the 
21-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the event. 
4.1 11-day Event Window  
The Event Window chooses the daily returns during the period of 5 days 
before and after the target event (-5 to +5) for study. The average abnormal 
return (AAR) of each day is shown in Graph1 below. We can find that AAR 
peeks at almost 0.05 on the announcement day, and its fluctuation range is 
from 0 to 0.05. This indicates that there is a positive abnormal return 







The regression of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is run by STATA. The 
regression results and the t-test for the significance are as follows: 
 
As shown in the table above, the p-value is 0.008, much less than 5%. This 
indicates that at 5% significant level, we should reject the null hypothesis H0 : 



























-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
diff
                                                                              
       _cons     .0831996   .0299923     2.77   0.008     .0225344    .1438648
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .18969
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0000
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    39) =    0.00
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      40
. reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust
. 
Graph1 11-day AAR 
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For the bootstrap test, the results are shown as below: 
 
The bootstrap test is a z-test to see whether the abnormal return is significant 
for all events in this sample. Since the p-value from the table is only 0.006, the 
null hypothesis should be rejected. We can announce that at 5% significant 
level, the abnormal return for all events is significant in statistics. 
In conclusion, during the 11-day Event Window, there exists a positive 
abnormal return caused by the stock repurchase announcement.  
4.1 21-day Event Window 
Based on Efficient Market Hypotheses (EMH), Chinese stock market is 
weak-form efficient, i.e., it has low degree on the speed of prices adjustment 
to information and the accuracy with which prices adjust. To guarantee the 
accuracy of the results, a longer Event Window is chosen to make a 
comparison. 
The 21-day Event Window is the period between 10 days before and 10 days 
after the repurchase announcement day (-10 to +10). The AAR is shown 
below in Graph 2: 
                                                                              
    boottest     .0831996   .0304765     2.73   0.006     .0234667    .1429325
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
                                                                              
     boottest:  r(cumret)
      command:  bootcumret
                                                Replications       =      1000





Similar to the results from Graph1, AAR peeks at 0.05 on the announcement 
day. During the 3 days from -1 to +1, the AAR changes dramatically, while it 
fluctuates from 0 to 0.02 excluding the 3 days. A positive abnormal return is 
aroused by share repurchase announcements. 
The results shown below from the CAR regression and the t-test for the 
21-day Event Window strongly support the conclusions of the 11-day Event 
Window. It is obvious to see that p-value is only 0.014, which is much less 
than 0.05. As the result, we should reject the null hypothesis H0 : 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖= 0; 
that is , the abnormal return is significant at 5% level. Note that here one stock 
missed some data for the 10 days’ return after the announcement, and has 



























-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
diff




The bootstrap test below shows the same analysis conclusion as before: 
 
We can see that the p-value from the table is 0.009, less than 0.05, so that the 
null hypothesis should be rejected. In conclusion, at 5% significant level, the 
abnormal return for all events in this sample is statistically significant. 
In a brief, there exists a positive abnormal return caused by the stock 
repurchase announcement during the period of -10 day to +10 day.  
The 21-day Event Window results prove the consistency with the conclusion 
from the 11-day Event Window results analysis. 
 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons       .10688   .0416932     2.56   0.014     .0224766    .1912834
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .26037
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0000
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    38) =    0.00
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      39
. reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust
. 
                                                                              
    boottest       .10688    .040616     2.63   0.009     .0272742    .1864858
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                 Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
                                                                              
     boottest:  r(cumret)
      command:  bootcumret
                                                Replications       =      1000





This paper designs an event study to empirically test if there is an abnormal 
return aroused by share repurchase announcements in Chinese capital 
market. It focuses on the performance of 40 stocks with buybacks during 
2005-2013 through Shanghai Stock Exchange. The SSE composite index is 
used as the benchmark to judge the existence of abnormal return. To make a 
comparison, the event study sets two short-term event windows, i.e. 11-day 
window and 21-window.  
During the testing process, we first calculate abnormal returns, cumulative 
abnormal returns and average abnormal returns by using the Market Model. 
These data present that there is a positive abnormal return surrounding stock 
buybacks announcements. Then, we need to test the significance of abnormal 
return by t-tests and bootstrap tests. The results show that the positive 
abnormal is statistically significant. Finally, we compare the testing results 
from 11-day window and 21-day window respectively. The conclusions are the 
same for these two short terms. 
The test in this paper makes a contribution to the study on the effect of share 
repurchases. Unlike the most of formal studies which only focus on US market, 
this test select a new and developing market - Chinese market to make a 
comparison. What is more, the testing results provide another support for the 
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positive relationship between the stock buybacks and abnormal returns 
surrounding the repurchase announcement date. The conclusion is in line 
with the studies of Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981, 1984), 
Lakonishok and Vermaelan (1990), Comment and Jarrell (1991), and 






With the further deregulation of open market operations after 2008 financial 
crisis, the occurrence of stock repurchases tends to meet another peek since 
the 1990. When doing the event study, we find an increasing number of 
Chinese companies have become familiar with the process of share buyback 
and tried to use it to achieve management targets. For examples, some firms 
used stock buyback in order to improve the financial leverage; some firms 
used this way to complete the equity incentive plan; and some firms used this 
way to signal the market that they are profitable in sequent years.  
All of motivations mentioned above are to make a bright prospect for the 
companies themselves through stock buybacks. Thus, in theory, stock 
repurchases will benefit the market investors. Moreover, the testing results in 
this paper evidence that when firms buy back shares, there exists a positive 
abnormal return on the stock prices. The results recommend that investors in 
the market can get a short-term abnormal return by react positively to the 
stocks of firms which announce share repurchases. 
Since share repurchase is still new to Chinese market, scholars and 
researchers need to collect more materials from the market, and keep further 
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Announcement  Date 
1 600019 Baosteel September 20, 2012 
2 600039 SC January 8, 2007 
3 600063 wwgf July 27, 2006 
4 600121 ZCE July 13, 2005 
5 600143 JINGFA July 29, 2013 
6 600192 GWE August 9, 2006 
7 600199 AGSW May 24, 2006 
8 600203 Furi August 23, 2006 
9 600228 CJBL May 11, 2006 
10 600340 CFLD June 12, 2006 
11 600380 Joincare February 17, 2011 
12 600418 JAC October 15, 2012 
13 600521 huahai January 6, 2006 
14 600523 GACO September 14, 2006 
15 600557 KANION May 17, 2012 
16 600567 Shanying August 26, 2005 
17 600577 JINGDA January 8, 2013 
18 600580 WOLONG ELE February 23, 2011 
19 600588 Yonyou December 21, 2012 
20 600594 YiBai August 22, 2012 
21 600598 hacl November 24, 2005 
22 600605 huitong August 3, 2006 
23 600642 Shenergy November 21, 2012 
24 600727 lubei July 21, 2006 
25 600746 SOPO June 22, 2006 
26 600765 zhzj June 20, 2006 
27 600810 Shenma March 13, 2006 
28 600839 CHANGHONG March 2, 2006 
29 600853 LONGJIAN October 13, 2006 
30 600867 GDB June 26, 2006 
31 600869 S&P March 24, 2009 
32 600876 LOBO March 16, 2007 
33 601088 CSEC June 8, 2009 





35 601088 CSEC May 30, 2011 
36 601088 CSEC June 24, 2013 
37 601566 jiumu May 20, 2013 
38 601636 qibin January 15, 2013 
39 601668 CSCEC June 3, 2013 
40 601799 XY November 27, 2012 
